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CONSENT TO SEARCH DOCTRINE 
REVISITED 
ANDREW G. PERRIN 
INTRODUCTION 
Picture this: it’s the day before Christmas Eve and you just killed a 
pedestrian in a motor vehicle accident. The police arrive, tell you they 
have no reason to believe you were at fault, but say they are nonetheless 
statutorily obligated to obtain blood and urine samples. They take you 
to the police station where you contact your attorney. He is unsure as to 
whether you should accede to the police’s demand (perhaps because 
you had a beer an hour before the incident) and requests to speak with 
the arresting officer to confirm that he in fact has a duty to collect body 
samples. Both the officer and his supervisor are confident that they do. 
In reality, the police may only perform these tests if they have 
probable cause to believe that the subject was at fault, which, 
admittedly, the police here do not. However, your attorney, after 
speaking with the officers, instructs you to comply with their demand. 
Later, a court finds the search illegal but holds the evidence—which is 
used to support a conviction for driving under the influence—
admissible because you “voluntarily” consented. 
The preceding scenario, based on the Alaska Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Anderson v. State,1 highlights substantial shortcomings in the 
traditional consent to search framework. Because the outcome should 
probably have differed under both federal and state precedent, the case 
illustrates the ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court’s “totality of 
circumstances” analysis, which leads to seemingly unpredictable and 
unjust results. 
This Note utilizes Anderson to underscore the deficiencies in the 
current consent doctrine and proposes a more workable, objective 
standard for Alaska to implement. Rather than requiring judges, as the 
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 1.  246 P.3d 930, 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
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traditional test demands, to engage in the impossible task of 
determining a subject’s state of mind at the time of accession to a search 
request, courts should instead examine the police’s actions for coercion 
or deception; the existence of the latter circumstances would render 
consent involuntary and thus invalid regardless of whether the police 
acted in good or bad faith. 
This proposal more effectively furthers Fourth Amendment 
interests in that it deters unconstitutional conduct by giving the police 
an incentive to avoid coercive actions that might undermine the 
voluntariness of consent. Unlike the current doctrine, it also better 
protects the State judiciary’s integrity by ensuring more foreseeable and 
fair results. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kevin J. Anderson, a forty-five-year-old lawyer, hit and killed a 
pedestrian while driving on a snowy Saturday afternoon in December 
2006.2 Although the police officer investigating the accident did not 
suspect Anderson of wrongdoing, he mistakenly believed that 
individuals involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious 
injury are required to provide blood and urine samples.3 Anderson was 
consequently transported to a police substation, where he contacted his 
attorney, Rex Lamont Butler.4 Before contacting Butler, Anderson 
refused to submit body samples, even after the officer informed him that 
he was statutorily required to do so.5 Anderson also admitted to 
consuming a beer more than an hour before the accident, though the 
police did not detect any signs of impairment and thus concededly did 
not have probable cause to collect blood and urine samples.6 
Butler discussed Alaska’s implied consent law with Anchorage 
Police Officer Thomas Gaulke before requesting to speak with Gaulke’s 
supervisor, Lieutenant Nancy Reeder.7 Both law enforcement officials 
mistakenly informed the attorney that, under Alaska’s implied consent 
law, his client was required to supply body samples; Anderson 
subsequently obliged.8 
The state charged Anderson with driving under the influence after 
tests revealed a blood alcohol level of .08 percent and that he had 
 
 2.  Id. at 931–32. 
 3.  Id. at 931. 
 4.  Id. at 931–32 . 
 5.  Id. at 932. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 936 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting). 
 8.  Id. at 932, 936. 
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consumed marijuana.9 Anderson moved to suppress the evidence from 
his blood and urine samples. The police, he argued, incorrectly advised 
him of their authority because, under State v. Blank,10 the police may 
only demand samples if they have probable cause.11 
The District Court concluded that Anderson had in fact been 
illegally detained.12 Nonetheless, the defendant’s consultation with his 
attorney prior to the illegal conduct rendered Anderson’s consent 
“voluntary.”13 Anderson was later found guilty of driving under the 
influence.14 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Schneckloth and “Voluntary” Consent 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and Section 1.14 
of the Alaska State Constitution, for that matter) guarantees “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”15 Under this basic constitutional 
protection, a search conducted without probable cause is “per se 
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”16 
One of these exceptions applies when individuals voluntarily 
consent to a search.17  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a 1973 Supreme Court 
case, established the prevailing “voluntariness” doctrine.18 In 
Schneckloth, a police officer stopped a vehicle after observing several 
burned-out exterior lights.19 The driver and all but one of the six 
individuals in the car did not possess a driver’s license.20 When the 
police officer asked if he could search the vehicle, the men readily 
 
 9.  Id. at 931. 
 10.  90 P.3d 156 (Alaska 2004). 
 11.  Anderson, 246 P.3d at 931. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. (stating that the district court found that Anderson’s consultation 
with his attorney insulated Anderson’s consent from the police officers’ illegal 
conduct). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Notably, Alaska’s constitution contains the exact 
same language as its federal counterpart. See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 1.14. 
 16.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 17.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
 18.  See id. at 233 (establishing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test). 
 19.  Id. at 220. 
 20.  Id. 
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acquiesced.21 A brief search revealed three stolen checks, which were 
later admitted as evidence against Robert Bustamonte, a passenger in 
the vehicle.22 
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the State must prove 
knowledge of the right to refuse consent, the Supreme Court concluded 
that “it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual 
consent that it can be ascertained whether . . . it was voluntary or 
coerced.”23 A survey of “voluntariness,” as defined in confession cases, 
revealed “no talismanic definition.”24 Instead, the term reflects “an 
accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police 
questioning of a suspect.”25 Broadly defined, the term accounts for the 
legitimate need for searches in law enforcement and, at the same time, 
“society’s deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an 
instrument of unfairness.”26 
Under Schneckloth, courts attempting to determine whether a 
particular instance of consent was voluntary may consider knowledge of 
the right to refuse, but “the government need not establish such 
knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”27 To mandate 
proof of a subject’s mental state would risk undermining the 
admissibility of legitimate evidence in instances where the defendant, 
who was in fact aware of his right to refuse consent, simply fails to 
testify.28 Nevertheless, the concept of voluntariness contemplates 
“evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any 
effective warnings to a person of his rights.”29 
Schneckloth also explicitly noted that consent “granted only in 
submission to a claim of lawful authority” is invalid.30 In so doing, the 
Court affirmed its earlier holding in Bumper v. North Carolina.31 Bumper 
involved an elderly woman who, after being told by police that they 
possessed a warrant, permitted them to search her house.32 After the 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 233. 
 24.  Id. at 224. 
 25.  Id. at 224–25. 
 26.  Id. at 225, 227. 
 27.  Id. at 227; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558–59 
(1980) (stating that “[a]lthough the Constitution does not require ‘proof of 
knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a 
search,’ such knowledge [is] highly relevant to the determination that there had 
been consent.”) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). 
 28.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230. 
 29.  Id. at 248. 
 30.  Id. at 233. 
 31.  391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
 32.  Id. at 546–47. 
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officers discovered a .22 caliber rifle that was allegedly used in a crime, 
the woman’s grandson, who was charged with committing the offense, 
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.33 The Court held that “[a] search conducted 
in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of 
consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.”34 The same is true 
“when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the 
validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any 
warrant at all.”35 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte further underscored that consent may not 
be coerced “by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert 
force.”36 The Court emphasized that: 
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by 
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally construed. 
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their 
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it 
consisted more in sound than in substance.37 
Account must be taken, therefore, of even the most “subtly coercive 
police questions.”38 
Schneckloth’s holding was specifically limited to cases where “the 
subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a 
search on the basis of his consent.”39 Unlike the “inherently coercive” 
custodial situations “that informed the Court’s holding in Miranda,”40 
consent searches generally take place in public, “under informal and 
unstructured conditions.”41 As a result, safeguards to protect persons 
suspected or accused of a crime, which would include proof of 
knowledge of the right to refuse consent, are unnecessary.42 
 
 33.  Id. at 544–45. 
 34.  Id. at 549. 
 35.  Id. at 549–50. 
 36.  412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 
 37.  Id. at 228–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 635 (1886)). 
 38.  Id. at 229. 
 39.  Id. at 248. 
 40.  Id. at 246–47 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)). 
 41.  See id. at 232 (stating that consent searches generally occur on a highway 
or in a person’s home or workplace, under informal, unstructured conditions). 
 42.  See id. at 247 (stating that the traditional test for determining 
voluntariness, which does not include knowledge of the right to refuse consent, 
should not be rejected in situations where a person is not in custody). 
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Accordingly, the Schneckloth Court had no reason to believe that, under 
the circumstances of a routine traffic stop, a driver’s response to a 
policeman’s question is presumptively coerced.43 
The Supreme Court further elucidated the Schneckloth standard 
three years later in United States v. Watson.44 In Watson, postal inspectors 
arrested Henry Watson for possession of stolen credit cards based on 
information provided by an informant.45 Officers removed the suspect 
from a restaurant to the street and read him the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona.46 A search of Watson’s person revealed no stolen 
credit cards.47 The police, after warning that anything found could be 
used against him, asked if they could search his vehicle.48 
Watson, arguing that “his consent to search the car was involuntary 
and ineffective because he had not been told that he could withhold 
consent,”49moved to suppress the evidence of stolen cards found in his 
car. Applying Schneckloth, the Court found that the totality of 
circumstances failed to demonstrate that Watson’s consent “was not his 
own ‘essentially free and unconstrained choice’ because his ‘will ha[d] 
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired.’”50Among other things, Watson gave consent in a public street 
as opposed to “the confines of a police station.”51 Also, he consented 
only after being read his Miranda rights, and there was no evidence that 
Watson was “unable in the face of a custodial arrest to exercise a free 
choice.”52 
Finally, the Supreme Court explicitly disqualified consent in two 
pre-Schneckloth cases where individuals assented in mere acquiescence 
to assertions of lawful authority. The Court’s first disqualification 
occurred in the context of a prohibition-era liquor law violation.53  
Federal officers came to the defendant’s home without a warrant, where 
they informed his wife that they had come to search the premises for 
violations of revenues law; the wife granted the men access to the 
home.54 In overturning the admission of evidence obtained as a result of 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976). 
 45.  Id. at 412–13. 
 46.   Id. at 413 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 425. 
 53.  See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314 (1921). 
 54.  Id. at 315. 
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their subsequent search, the Supreme Court held that “it is perfectly 
clear that under the implied coercion here presented” the defendant did 
not waive his Fourth Amendment rights.55 The facts demonstrated 
“clearly the unconstitutional character of the seizure by which the 
property which [the government] introduced was obtained.”56 
In Johnson v. United States, the Court also suppressed evidence 
obtained by mere submission to authority.57 The police, acting on a tip 
by an informant that people were smoking opium at a hotel, followed 
the smell of burning opium in the hallways.58 They knocked on the 
defendant’s door, and she denied any smell of opium emanating from 
her room.59 The officers subsequently stated that the defendant should 
consider herself “under arrest because we are going to search your 
room.”60 In suppressing the evidence subsequently obtained, the 
Supreme Court found that “[e]ntry to [the] defendant’s living quarters, 
which was the beginning of the search, was demanded under color of 
office. It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an 
understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.”61 Thus, 
because the defendant consented under the belief that she had no choice 
in the matter, the consent to search was not voluntary. 
B. Voluntary Consent and Prior Illegalities 
Even if consent to search is voluntarily given, that consent is 
invalid if obtained by exploiting a prior illegal act.62 Wong Sun v. United 
States confronted the issue of whether declarations made immediately 
after an arrest without probable cause are admissible as evidence or 
must be excluded.63 Rejecting the government’s argument that the 
subject’s statements resulted from “an intervening independent act of 
free will,” the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances, 
where the police broke through the defendant’s door, promptly and 
unjustifiably handcuffed and arrested him, “it is unreasonable to infer 
that [the subject’s] response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge 
the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.”64 
 
 55.  Id. at 317. 
 56.  Id. at 316. 
 57.  See 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 58.  Id. at 12. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 13. 
 62.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
 63.  See id. at 484 (holding subsequent declarations inadmissible when 
obtained through an agent’s unlawful action). 
 64.  Id. at 486. 
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Wong Sun also rejected the government’s alternative contention that 
the defendant’s statements should be admitted because they were 
“ostensibly exculpatory rather than incriminating.”65 Instead, the Court 
found “no substantial reason” to preclude the defendant’s statements 
from the exclusionary rule,66 which bars evidence “obtained either 
during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.”67 The 
circumstances were coercive, and the statements were in fact 
incriminating, not exculpatory, as “they led directly to evidence which 
implicated [the defendant];” the motion to suppress was granted.68 
After emphasizing that “knowledge gained by the Government’s 
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed,”69 the Supreme 
Court formulated a test: the question, in cases where the issue is 
whether evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ is “whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.”70 
A decade later the Supreme Court reaffirmed Wong Sun’s 
requirement that statements made subsequent to an illegal arrest, in 
order to be admissible at trial, must be voluntary and made on a 
defendant’s own volition.71 Brown v. Illinois held that if the causal chain 
between the prior illegality and the statements made is not sufficiently 
broken, the evidence falls short of constitutional requirements.72 
Brown also underlined that Wong Sun “mandates consideration of a 
statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of 
the Fourth Amendment.”73 Miranda warnings alone, while sufficient to 
effectuate Fifth Amendment interests, are insufficient to deter unlawful 
searches and seizures.74 Unequivocally permitting the use of evidence 
obtained by virtue of a search that, though without probable cause was 
preceded by Miranda warning, would effectively eliminate “[a]ny 
incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations” and would reduce an 
 
 65.  Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 485. 
 68.  Id. at 487. 
 69.  Id. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 392 (1920)). 
 70.  Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR, MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 
(1959)). 
 71.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975). 
 72.  See id. (discussing requirements for the causal chain to be broken). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 601–02. 
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essential constitutional protection to “‘a form of words.’”75 
Florida v. Royer presents an additional case where the Supreme 
Court held that consent, while arguably voluntary, was insufficiently 
removed from an illegal arrest to prove that it would otherwise have 
been given.76 Royer, who was flying out of Miami International Airport, 
was identified by two narcotics detectives as a suspicious individual.77 
The police officers took the young man to a storage closet, retrieved his 
luggage, informed Royer that they had reason to suspect him of 
transporting narcotics, and asked if he would consent to a search of his 
luggage.78 In affirming the appellate court’s suppression of the drugs 
found in Royer’s suitcases, the Supreme Court highlighted that the 
officers’ primary purpose in moving to the interrogation from the 
concourse was to search the luggage.79 Had police requested consent to 
search in the airport terminal, any evidence obtained would have been 
admissible.80 Under the circumstances, however, where the suspect was 
effectively in custody, it was unreasonable to infer that consent was 
voluntary.81 
C. Alaska Cases 
Alaska case law follows U.S. Supreme Court precedent and actually 
evinces greater protection of individual privacy, a state privilege that 
has been repeatedly affirmed.82 In Erickson v. State,83 for example, a case 
decided two months before Schneckloth, Alaska’s highest court noted 
that “consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, 
specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or 
coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred.”84 Moreover, “‘any new 
 
 75.  Id. at 602–03 (internal citations omitted). 
 76.  460 U.S. 491, 502–03 (1983). 
 77.  Id. at 493. 
 78.  Id. at 494. 
 79.  Id. at 505. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See id. (“[The] primary interest of the officers [in moving from the 
airport concourse to a closet-sized interrogation room] was not in having an 
extended conversation with Royer but in the contents of his luggage . . . .”). 
 82.  See Aaron H. Mendelsohn, The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops: 
Bright-Line Rules in Conjunction with the Totality of Circumstances Test, 88 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930, 954 (1998) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly advised 
state courts that they may construe their own constitutions to provide broader 
individual liberties than those provided under the federal constitution. Likewise, 
the Court has advised state courts that they may construe their own 
constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than 
does the federal constitution.”). 
 84.507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973). 
 84.  Id.  at 515 (internal citations omitted). 
PERRIN_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012  5:19 PM 
298 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 29:2 
exception to the warrant requirement, no matter how reasonable in 
terms of its purpose, is viewed with caution.’”85 
The Alaska Court of Appeals followed Erickson’s reasoning in a 
more recent decision, where it found that mere acquiescence to lawful 
authority does not constitute consent, even where a subject expressly 
assents to a search.86 The court found, in the context of a supposedly 
voluntary consent during an airport security screening, that express 
assent is not always sufficient.87 When confronted with an authority’s 
supposed lawful right to perform a search, an individual’s decision lacks 
the requisite voluntariness to pass constitutional muster.88 
Frink v. State,89 another post-Schneckloth decision, also supports the 
proposition that Alaska law favors a standard that requires at least some 
knowledge of a right to refuse consent. After discussing Erickson, the 
court found the defendant’s consent voluntary because he “‘was a 
person who knew what his rights were . . . at the time he allowed [the 
police] to search his car.’”90 Although law enforcement officials “did not 
specifically tell Frink that he had the right to refuse their request, they did 
nothing to indicate that he had to comply with their request and the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the search does not suggest Frink consented 
because his will was overborne.”91 
Sleziak v. State,92 also a pre-Schneckloth case, further highlights 
Alaska’s generally more stringent protections against involuntary search 
and seizure. Acknowledging that search and seizure issues are 
adjudicated based on the unique “facts and circumstances,”93 the State 
Supreme Court held that “when the accused is directly asked whether 
he objects to the search, there must be at least some suggestion that his 
objection is significant or that the search waits upon his consent.”94 Only 
when “combined with a warning of his right to be silent, and his right to 
 
 85.  Id. (citing Ferguson v. State, 488 P.2d 1032, 1035–36 (Alaska 1971)). 
 86.  See Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 615–16 (1999) (stating that “express 
assent is not sufficient. . . . Schaffer’s assent to the search of her belongings was 
‘nothing more than acquiescence to apparent lawful authority.’”). 
 87.  Id. at 615. 
 88.  See id. at 614 (“[E]ven if [the express] assent [of the passenger] were 
obtained, the choices with which the passenger is confronted are such that 
voluntariness will ordinarily be lacking” (quoting WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 10.6(g) at 644–45 (3d ed. 
1996))). 
 89.  597 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1979). 
 90.  Id. at 167 (quoting Frink v. State, 1990 WL 10567997 at *1 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Nov. 14, 1990)). 
 91.  Id. at 167–68 (emphasis added). 
 92.  454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969). 
 93.  Id. at 256. 
 94.  Id. at 257. 
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counsel” is it “fair to infer that his purported consent is in fact 
voluntary.”95 This implies that consent, in order to be voluntary, must 
not only be given freely, the subject must also be given the option to 
refuse consent. 
The Court of Appeals has also recently indicated a more stringent 
approach to interpreting voluntariness than is required by federal law. 
In Brown v. State,96 the court confronted the issue of when a routine 
traffic stop becomes unreasonable and unconstitutional, thus 
invalidating any subsequent consent to search.97 Concluding that federal 
law does not adequately protect motorists, the court joined “state courts 
that have decided that their state constitutions require greater 
restrictions on police authority in this situation than the restrictions 
imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”98 
Brown found that the psychological pressures inherent in a police 
request to search, combined with ignorance of rights, causes “large 
numbers of motorists—guilty and innocent alike—[to] accede to these 
requests.”99 
III. HOLDING 
In Anderson, the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court’s Driving Under the Influence conviction and denied the motion 
to suppress the blood test evidence. The majority found it was 
reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that Anderson’s consent was 
voluntary because the defendant had the chance to consult with his 
attorney and there was a forty-minute interval between the police’s 
initial incorrect assertion of authority and Anderson’s consent to 
provide body samples.100 
In reaching its conclusion that the consent was not tainted by the 
prior illegality, the Court relied mostly on Anderson’s opportunity to 
consult with his attorney.101 Writing for the majority, Judge Coates 
argued that, had Anderson been unimpaired at the time of the accident, 
it would have been in his best interest to unequivocally exonerate 
himself by submitting to a blood test.102 
The majority further speculated as to what Butler, Anderson’s 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  182 P.3d 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 97.  Id. at 624–25. 
 98.  Id. at 626. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 932 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
 101.  Id. at 931. 
 102.  Id. at 933. 
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attorney, may have advised his client after speaking with the arresting 
officer and Lieutenant Reeder. Butler may have made the same mistake 
as law enforcement; or perhaps he believed, based on Anderson’s claim 
that he had only had one beer, that the blood samples would prove 
exculpatory.103 
Judge Bolger wrote separately to analyze the case in accordance 
with three factors “suggested” by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Illinois “for determining whether a confession is tainted: (1) the temporal 
proximity of the arrest and the confession, (2) the presence of 
intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose or flagrancy of the 
official misconduct.”104 With regard to the first factor, he found that the 
forty-minute interval weighed in favor of suppression.105 However, the 
opportunity to consult with counsel, the fact that police officers relied on 
a statute on good-faith, and their “patient[]” and “polite[]” treatment of 
Anderson weighed against suppression on both the second and third 
factors.106 
In his dissent, Judge Mannheimer emphasized that the police 
officers explicitly asserted their right to demand blood samples, and that 
this was their stated justification for taking Anderson into custody.107 
That they made their demand politely and in good faith, he argued, 
“does nothing to alter the involuntariness of Anderson’s decision.”108 
Judge Mannheimer also attacked the applicability of the cases on 
which Judge Bolger relied to justify Anderson’s consultation with his 
attorney as an intervening event.109 They involved situations where “a 
defendant, after consultation with his counsel, made a post-arrest 
decision to submit to a police interview, or to consent to a search, with 
full understanding that the defendant had no obligation to cooperate 
with the police investigation.”110 Under such circumstances, courts may 
naturally assume that the attorney advised his or her client of their right 
to refuse a search.111 Given that both Anderson and his attorney were 
repeatedly told that there was no choice but to consent, the latter 
assumption does not apply in the instant case.112 
Mannheimer also rejected as implausible the possibility that 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. (internal citations omitted) (Bolger, J., concurring). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 935 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 936. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
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Anderson acted on accurate legal advice. Instead, the facts indicate “that 
Anderson’s attorney acquiesced in the officer’s assertions of authority 
and directed his client to provide the body samples.”113 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Anderson v. State departs from 
established federal and Alaska state precedent. In doing so, it 
undermines the fundamental guarantee against unreasonable search 
and seizure. The outcome also seemingly falls short of reason: how 
could consent, given only in the face of repeated insistence of absolute 
authority to compel compliance, be deemed voluntary, especially when 
the subject initially refused to consent? 
The answer lies in the amorphous nature of the “voluntariness” 
doctrine itself, as well as an underlying institutional bias toward 
furthering society’s interest in effective law enforcement, particularly 
because the evidence sought suppressed is inevitably incriminating. To 
prevent future injustice, Alaska should move toward a more objective 
test that, instead of relying on a court’s ability to discern an individual’s 
state of mind at the time of the alleged consent, would examine the 
actions of law enforcement for coercive or deceptive behavior. 
A. Anderson’s Consent Was Not Voluntary 
Anderson, in direct contradiction to Schneckloth and Bumper, 
validates the voluntariness of consent despite coercive and deceptive 
circumstances. In Bumper, the Supreme Court held that an express or 
implied claim of authority by the police weighs heavily in favor of 
voiding consent.114 Here, both the arresting and supervising police 
officers expressly asserted, both to Anderson and his attorney, their 
statutory duty to collect blood and urine samples from individuals 
involved in serious traffic accidents.115 Anderson refused to oblige until 
his attorney, who had no time to conduct independent research, 
instructed him to do so.116 
While Schneckloth rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the 
government must establish knowledge of the right to refuse to prove the 
validity of consent, it held that this factor is “to be taken into account.”117 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968). 
 115.  Anderson, 246 P.3d at 936. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
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In the case at issue, it is clear that neither Anderson nor the two police 
officers were aware of State v. Blank, at the time a relatively recent 
Alaska Supreme Court decision holding that the implied consent statute, 
to pass constitutional muster, requires police officers to have probable 
cause that a crime has occurred before they demand blood and urine 
samples.118 The general ignorance of the applicable law by all parties 
involved should have factored more heavily in favor of suppression. 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals implied that Anderson’s 
opportunity to consult with his attorney, who presumably had 
knowledge of basic criminal procedure, conclusively supported a 
finding of voluntary consent.119 Given the circumstances of the case, 
however, it seems unreasonable to assume that Butler was apprised of 
the current state of the law.120 It is implausible, as the majority’s opinion 
suggests, that an experienced attorney, whose client admitted to 
consuming alcohol before a serious car accident but was not under 
suspicion by the police, would instruct his client to voluntarily consent 
to a test that could prove incriminating.121 More realistically, the facts 
suggest that Butler was as ignorant of the relevant law as everyone else. 
Consequently, Anderson’s status as a qualified lawyer, though 
used by the majority to support the voluntariness of the defendant’s 
consent, also weighs in favor of suppressing the evidence. Anderson 
obviously knew how much he had to drink, and must have suspected 
that his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. If he had known of 
his right to refuse the test in the absence of probable cause, why would 
he voluntary consent to provide body samples? 
The Court of Appeals also neglected to acknowledge that the 
traditional “voluntariness” analysis is confined to instances where the 
defendant is not in custody.122 Custodial situations are inherently more 
coercive, as people are more likely to succumb to police pressure. 
Granted, Anderson had the opportunity to contact his attorney by 
phone. However, the court should have at the very least considered the 
custodial situation as an additional factor weighing in Anderson’s favor. 
Alaska’s appellate court also failed to consider Anderson’s initial 
 
 118.  90 P.3d 156, 158 (2004). 
 119.  See Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 932-33 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining that even if his attorney had been aware of the law he may have 
advised Anderson to provide body samples). 
 120.  Id. (“[D]etermining whether Anderson was required by law to submit 
blood and urine samples required knowledge of the supreme court’s decision in 
State v. Blank.”). 
 121.  Id. at 932. 
 122.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that the traditional ‘totality of 
circumstances’ test applies only where “the subject of a search is not in 
custody”). 
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unwillingness to submit to testing; if, when the events at issue took 
place, he did not have reservations about providing body samples, 
Anderson presumably would not have felt the need to contact his 
attorney. Although the Supreme Court has not said so explicitly, 
Professor Wayne LaFave, a Fourth Amendment authority, believes that 
a “suspect’s earlier refusal to give consent is a factor which is properly 
taken into account as a part of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in 
judging the later consent under the [Bustamonte] formula.”123 The 
Anderson majority made no mention of this crucial circumstance. 
The totality of the circumstances thus strongly suggests that, as in 
Amos and Johnson, Anderson merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful 
authority. The police repeatedly asserted their statutory duty to test for 
alcohol and drug impairment. The facts do not suggest that Anderson 
knowingly and intelligently chose to waive his constitutional rights. 
True, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search proved that 
Anderson was in fact impaired when he killed the pedestrian. But, like 
in Amos and Johnson, Anderson’s guilt is irrelevant; the Constitution 
does not serve to solely protect the innocent. 
While the facts generally weigh in favor of voiding consent under 
the federal “voluntariness” standard, Anderson’s consent is more 
definitively unconstitutional under Alaska precedent. As indicated 
above, Frink implies that a valid consent requires knowledge of the right 
to refuse.124 Sleziak suggests that, to uphold consent, there must be clear 
evidence the police did not create the impression that they have the 
right to conduct a search regardless of the subject’s wishes.125 Here, the 
facts imply that Anderson was unaware of his right to refuse and the 
police continually asserted their obligation to conduct the search in 
question. These facts, in conjunction with the Court of Appeals’ effort to 
apply “greater restrictions on police authority in this situation than the 
restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,”126 should have made Anderson a relatively 
straightforward consent-voiding decision. 
 
 123.  4 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 8.2(f) (4th ed. 2004). 
 124.  See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (finding consent 
voluntary because the defendant “knew what his rights were . . . at the time he 
allowed [the police] to search his car”). 
 125.  454 P.2d 252, 267 (Alaska 1969) (stating that there must be some 
suggestion by the police that an objection to search is significant or that it awaits 
consent). 
 126.  Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 626 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
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B. Anderson’s Consent, Even if Voluntary, is Invalid 
Even if Anderson’s consent was arguably voluntary, it is 
nonetheless invalid, because the consent came at the exploitation of, and 
was not properly insulated from, an illegal arrest. The appellate court’s 
reliance on Anderson’s opportunity to consult with his attorney fails to 
appreciate the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter 
unconstitutional conduct. In direct contradiction, the court incidentally 
creates a means for the police to circumvent Fourth Amendment 
protections by permitting the use of illegally obtained information as 
long as the suspect was afforded the opportunity to consult with 
counsel. 
The Court of Appeals and District Court relied primarily on the fact 
that Anderson had the opportunity to consult with his attorney in 
justifying the consent as untainted by the illegal conduct.127 In Brown v. 
Illinois, however, the Supreme Court stated clearly that Miranda-type 
safeguards, which include the right to consult an attorney, are 
insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests.128 Anderson presents 
the type of scenario that the Court presumably contemplated in making 
this assertion. 
In the context of the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings serve to 
deter an individual in custody from making incriminating statements 
under the “‘the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.’”129 
With regard to the Fourth Amendment, however, allowing law 
enforcement to make admissible statements that would otherwise be 
inadmissible by simply giving Miranda warnings would, as the Supreme 
Court highlighted, undermine the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to 
deter unlawful conduct “‘and compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the 
incentive to disregard it.’”130 Although the police did not act maliciously 
in Anderson, the case also creates an incentive for police to improperly 
extract admissible evidence by simply claiming ignorance of what the 
law actually requires. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals neglected to consider the effect of 
Anderson’s custodial situation in finding his consent sufficiently 
removed from the prior illegality. Royer, as discussed above, implied 
that an illegal detention almost invariably taints consent to search.131 
 
 127.  Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011). 
 128.  422 U.S. 590, 601–02 (1975). 
 129.  Id. at 600 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1973)). 
 130.  Id. at 599–600 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 131.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (“[B]ecause we affirm the 
Florida Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Royer was being illegally detained 
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Thus, irrespective of policy concerns, Anderson’s consent should have 
been found invalid. 
C. Problems with the Consent Doctrine 
Anderson exemplifies the “voluntariness” doctrine’s inherent 
ambiguity. The test demands that courts engage in the task of discerning 
a defendant’s inner thoughts at the time he or she gave consent. Given 
the difficulty of doing so, courts rarely do more, as Professor Marcy 
Strauss has highlighted, than recite factual information followed by 
conclusory statements about whether the consent was voluntary.132 
Thus, the problem with regard to the doctrine’s application is twofold: 
(1) the “voluntariness” test is too vague to provide any real guidance to 
courts, litigants, or the police; and (2) it fails to account for the fact that 
most people inevitably feel coerced by a police “request” to search.133 
These problems, in turn, undermine the integrity of both law 
enforcement and the judicial process. 
1. Consent Is Rarely Found Involuntary 
Although often invoked, the traditional “voluntariness” test rarely 
leads to an invalidated consent. Judges seldom attempt to analyze the 
numerous subjective Schneckloth factors related to the individual’s 
mental state or character.134 In reading every published federal and state 
level consent case within a three-year time span, Strauss discovered that 
courts overwhelmingly included merely a paragraph on the concept of 
“voluntariness,” followed by a statement regarding the state’s burden to 
prove that the consent was voluntary.135 Out of hundreds of decisions, 
only a handful of cases actually analyzed the defendant’s subjective 
mental state at the time of the alleged consent; and even fewer found 
these factors sufficiently compelling.136 
Consent was invalidated only in instances where, for example, the 
defendant spoke no English and received a mistranslated statement 
indicating that the police had a permit to search when, in fact, they had 
merely requested consent.137  Conversely, consent was validated in cases 
 
when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was 
tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.”). 
 132.  Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 
213 (2001). 
 133.  Id. at 221. 
 134.  Id. at 222. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. (citing Lobania v. Arkansas, 959 S.W.2d 72, 74 (2005)). 
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where the suspect had an IQ of 76 and suffered from psychological 
problems, because, as in Anderson, the police behaved non-
threateningly.138 Consent was even upheld in instances where the 
defendant was young and uneducated, surrounded by several “large” 
officers, and had previously refused police requests to search four 
times.139 In another case, consent was found voluntary despite being 
granted only after the suspect was arrested, handcuffed, and held on the 
ground at gunpoint.140 Shockingly, not a single case considered a 
suspect’s ignorance of his right to refuse or the police’s failure to inform 
him of his rights as relevant in and of itself.141 
While the “voluntariness” analysis, based on “totality of 
circumstances,” in theory allows for a context-specific examination, in 
practice courts validate consent “‘in all but the most extreme 
circumstances.’”142 
2. The Traditional “Voluntariness” Doctrine’s Shortcomings 
Why is consent, given the government’s burden of proof on the 
matter, rarely invalidated? For one, courts are ill equipped to make these 
types of determinations. As Strauss explains, “deciding whether a 
person’s education, IQ, psychological difficulties, cultural experiences 
and past interactions with the police render a consent involuntary is 
difficult under the best of circumstances.”143 Thus, when the task is 
“undertaken by individuals who typically share none of the fear, 
background or beliefs of the suspects, it is not surprising that little 
weight is often assigned to these subjective factors.”144 
The amorphous nature of the test itself, which provides little 
concrete guidance, also leads courts to invariably neglect the doctrine’s 
more nuanced aspects. At the same time, judges are inherently guided 
by the need to balance privacy rights with a societal interest in effective 
law enforcement. 
To complicate matters further, courts inevitably consider these 
issues in the context of suppressing evidence that was discovered during 
 
 138.  Id. at 223 (citing State v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 139.  Id. at 223–24 (citing United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir.  
2008)). 
 140.  Id. at 226 (citing United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555–56 (1st Cir. 
1983)). 
 141.  See id. at 224 (stating that not a single case found “a suspect’s testimony 
that he did not know of his rights and that the police failed to inform him of 
them significant on its own”). 
 142.  Id. at 223 (quoting DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1999)). 
 143.  Id. at 227. 
 144.  Id. 
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the search in question. Because, as would have been the case in Anderson 
had the outcome differed, an invalid search causes highly relevant 
evidence to be suppressed, “it is not surprising judges place a finger on 
that part of the scale that emphasizes society’s interest in promoting 
unfettered police investigation.”145 In addition, unlike in the confession 
context, the voluntariness of consent does not affect the reliability of the 
evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional conduct. Thus, 
courts are naturally reluctant to find in the defendant’s favor. 
The “voluntariness” standard also fails to account for the fact that 
most individuals are effectively incapable of denying a police officer’s 
request to search. Numerous studies indicate that even under seemingly 
non-coercive circumstances, where the police officer is polite without his 
gun drawn and the request is made in a ‘comfortable’ environment, 
people consent even though they have nothing to gain by doing so.146 
Obedience to authority is deeply ingrained, and individuals 
consequently agree to things that are not necessarily in their own best 
interest; this is especially true when the authority figure in question is 
dressed in a uniform.147 
Certain minorities, particularly African-Americans, are more likely 
to perceive a police request as an unequivocal demand, as they are more 
prone believe that a refusal to comply with law enforcement may lead to 
serious and deadly consequences.148 In addition, from a linguistic 
perspective, a request made by law enforcement effectively 
communicates the ability to compel compliance notwithstanding a 
subject’s preference, which further explains the general tendency to 
interpret a question by the police as a command.149 
In sum, the amorphous nature of the traditional voluntariness 
doctrine, while intended to allow for context-specific analysis, provides 
little objective guidance. In practice, in the face of reliable and 
incriminating evidence, courts shy away from the impossible task of 
determining a subject’s state of mind at the time he or she gave consent, 
and instead grasp any sort of concrete fact to support their conclusion. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Anderson majority, perhaps seeking 
to avoid seemingly nebulous and speculative reasoning, seized on the 
fact that the defendant had consulted with his attorney as an 
unambiguous means of justifying its decision to admit the body 
 
 145.  Id. at 228. 
 146.  Id. at 236 (citing Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some 
Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures, Should Race Matter? 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1991)). 
 147.  Id. at 236. 
 148.  Id. at 242–43. 
 149.  Id. at 242. 
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samples. 
They made this decision, given the undeniably accurate test results, 
knowing that Anderson had with virtual certainty violated the law by 
driving intoxicated, and naturally inferring that he was therefore likely 
at fault in the pedestrian’s death. From their ex-post perspective, it is not 
surprising the court would place less weight on amorphous facts 
suggesting the defendant’s state of mind. 
D. The Objective and More Effective Framework 
Coercion negates consent.150 Unfortunately, the “totality of 
circumstances” test provides courts with little clear guidance for 
determining when coercion exists. Furthermore, judges tend to examine 
a case for both coercion and voluntariness without distinguishing 
between the two concepts.151 A coerced consent, at least at some level, 
still involves a choice; as a result, courts tend to readily find 
voluntariness.152 
This Note proposes that Alaska should employ a more objective 
test, adopted from the confession context, as part of the established 
consent analysis. Instead of focusing on the voluntariness of consent, 
courts should evaluate the actions of the police and, where those actions 
are coercive or deceptive, invalidate consent regardless of whether the 
police acted in good or bad faith. The latter framework is more easily 
applied by courts and furthers the declared purpose of the traditional 
“totality of circumstances” test—to deter conduct that violates the 
Fourth Amendment.153 Also, because it interprets individual freedoms 
more broadly than the Federal Constitution, the proposed test does not 
implicate the Supremacy Clause.154 
As indicated above, the analysis for determining the voluntariness 
of consent was in large part derived from the confession context.155 It 
thus makes sense, in the search for a solution to the issues presented 
with the traditional consent doctrine, to examine relevant evolutions in 
the confession framework. 
 
 150.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (stating that “two 
competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a 
‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such searches and the equally 
important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”). 
 151.  Rebecca Strauss, We Can Do This The Easy Way Or The Hard Way: The Use 
Of Deceit To Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 883 (2002). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602–03 (1975). 
 154.  See Mendelsohn, supra note 82 at 936–37. 
 155.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224. 
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In Colorado v. Connelly, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
confessions should be scrutinized primarily for coercive police behavior 
rather than evaluated generally for voluntariness.156 The Colorado 
Supreme Court had affirmed the suppression of a confession by a 
mentally disturbed defendant, because his chronic schizophrenia and 
psychotic state vitiated his waiver of right to counsel and protection 
against self-incrimination.157 In reversing the state court, Justice 
Rehnquist underscored the difficulty with the “voluntariness” approach 
in that “it fails to recognize the essential link between coercive activity of 
the State, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by [the] defendant, 
on the other.”158 The latter approach requires courts “to divine a 
defendant’s motivation for speaking or acting as he did.”159 A focus on 
coercion more effectively furthers the Fifth Amendment’s purpose.160 
Importing this approach to the consent context would likewise 
promote Fourth Amendment interests. An evaluation of coercive or 
deceptive circumstances surrounding consent is both more objective and 
straightforward than attempting to understand a defendant’s inner 
thoughts. Because this framework is more easily applied, courts are 
more likely to scrutinize consent and, consequently, less inclined, as 
they do now with the focus on subjective factors, to readily find 
voluntariness. With its emphasis on police conduct, the proposal also 
concentrates more directly on whether consent was “granted only in 
submission to a claim of lawful authority”161 and provides a more 
effective tool to measure whether consent was freely and voluntarily 
given. 
The doctrine modification also deters unconstitutional police 
action, which, as Joseph Caraccio has underscored, can only be 
accomplished by denying law enforcement “both the incidental as well 
as the direct benefits of their misconduct.”162 The framework precludes 
police from innocently or purposely claiming ignorance of the law as a 
means of validating an involuntary consent; consent obtained through 
 
 156.  See 479 U.S. 157, 169 (“[O]f course, a waiver must at a minimum be 
‘voluntary’ to be effective against an accused”); see id. at 163–64 (“while each 
confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that 
police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of 
coercive police conduct”). 
 157.  Id. at 162. 
 158.  Id. at 165. 
 159.  See id. at 165–66. 
 160.  Id. at 170 (noting that Miranda protects defendants against government 
coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment). 
 161.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973). 
 162.  Joseph G. Casaccio, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and 
Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV.  842, 844 (1987). 
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coercive or deceptive means, in good or bad faith, is void. Similarly, 
consent given after a defendant has the opportunity to contact an 
attorney would not be unequivocally valid (as is effectively the case 
under the traditional test), because the consent could nonetheless have 
been the product of coercion or deception. 
As applied to Anderson, the proposed framework would have led to 
the opposite outcome. Anderson acceded to the request for body 
samples only after both he and his attorney were repeatedly and 
incorrectly told that the police are statutorily obligated to obtain them. 
By unintentionally deceiving Anderson into believing that he had no 
choice in the matter, the police coerced his consent. Moreover, because 
the consent was coerced, it was involuntary. 
This clear-cut analysis does not require the kinds of subjective facts 
and conjecture involved in deciphering a defendant’s state of mind. 
Because it focuses on coercive police conduct, the objective test also 
incorporates the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine’s focus on 
whether consent was obtained “by exploitation of [a prior] illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint;”163 a consent to search that is given only because the 
defendant is falsely taken into custody, for example, is presumably 
coerced. Thus, the proposed standard accounts for both whether consent 
was voluntary and whether it was facilitated by prior illegal conduct. 
Finally, the proposed rule, which more effectively protects against 
unreasonable search and seizure, is in keeping with Alaska’s tradition of 
strong privacy rights. Ravin v. State, for example, held that Alaska’s 
constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, confers a protected right for 
adults to possess marijuana.164 The case, decided in 1975, was 
remarkably progressive relative to other states. It emphasized that 
Alaska “has traditionally been the home of people who prize their 
individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in 
order to achieve a level of control over their lifestyles which is now 
virtually unattainable in many of our sister states.”165 When a ballot 
initiative in 1999 repealed a law enacted in accordance with Ravin, the 
Court of Appeals struck down the initiative as unconstitutional.166 
Adopting the proposed amendment to the consent doctrine would thus 
hardly constitute Alaska’s first initiative that went against the prevailing 
grain in the furtherance of individual rights.167 
 
 163.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
 164.  537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 167.  See, e.g., Anchorage Police Dep’t. Emps. Ass’n. v. Anchorage, 24 P.3d 
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CONCLUSION 
The traditional consent doctrine, with its “totality of circumstances” 
and “voluntariness” approach, fails to effectively further the Fourth 
Amendment’s purpose. Anderson v. State highlights how the framework, 
while intended to account for any given set of circumstances, provides 
judges with insufficient guidance. As a result, courts find voluntary 
consent in all but the most extreme cases. The latter tendency is also 
explained by the nature of a suppression case, where the court is 
confronted with a motion to suppress reliable and incriminating 
evidence, as well as a judicial interest in facilitating effective law 
enforcement. 
To remedy the federal consent doctrine’s shortcomings, Alaska 
should adopt a more objective test that, instead of requiring courts to 
telepathically determine whether a defendant’s decision was reached 
with sufficient free will, focuses on police conduct: where the police 
exhibit coercive or deceptive behavior, in good or bad faith, consent is 
involuntary and therefore void. This framework condenses the 
“voluntariness” and “fruit of the poisonous tree” analysis into a single 




547, 558 (Alaska 2001) (striking down Anchorage’s random drug testing policy 
for police and fire fighters because, in the absence of documented history of 
abuse, the “continuous and unrelenting scrutiny that exposes the employee to 
unannounced testing at virtually any time” is unconstitutional). 
